Currier v. Virginia

Petitioner Michael Currier faced charges of burglary, grand larceny, and unlawful firearm possession in Virginia. With his consent, the charges were severed for trial. A first jury acquitted him on the larceny and firearm counts but deadlocked on burglary. Before a retrial on the hung burglary count, Currier moved to bar relitigation of factual issues he argued the first jury necessarily decided in his favor, invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause’s issue preclusion component. The trial court denied the motion, and a second jury convicted him. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that by agreeing to separate trials, Currier effectively consented to distinct proceedings, so relitigating the disputed facts did not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, affirmed the Virginia Supreme Court and held that the second trial did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. The majority reasoned that consent to severance created two separate trials, so the second jury was not bound by the first jury’s implicit factual findings. Currier’s conviction was upheld.

Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause's issue preclusion component bars a retrial on a hung count when the defendant consented to severance, and the retrial requires relitigation of factual issues the first jury necessarily resolved by acquitting on other counts.

The decision significantly narrowed the scope of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) under the Double Jeopardy Clause. It established that a defendant’s strategic choice to sever charges can waive protection against relitigating facts previously decided by an acquittal. Critics warn this undermines the finality of acquittals and may pressure defendants into consolidated trials, while proponents argue it respects procedural autonomy and the integrity of separate jury verdicts.