Marinello v. United States

Carlo J. Marinello, II operated a small courier service and was indicted for violating the Omnibus Clause of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), which criminalizes corruptly obstructing or impeding the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code. The government alleged he failed to maintain corporate records, shredded documents, and concealed income to obstruct the IRS. Marinello was convicted in federal district court, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over the required mental state. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that to convict under the Omnibus Clause, the government must prove the defendant was aware of a specific pending tax-related proceeding, such as an investigation or audit, and intended to obstruct it. Because the jury instructions did not demand such knowledge, the Court vacated Marinello's conviction and remanded, significantly narrowing the scope of the statute.

The United States Supreme Court vacated the conviction and remanded the case. The Court ruled 7-2 that the government must establish the defendant was aware of a specific pending tax proceeding and intended to interfere with it. The prior jury instructions were constitutionally deficient.

Whether a conviction under the Omnibus Clause of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) requires proof that the defendant knew of a specific, pending tax-related proceeding, or whether a general intent to obstruct the administration of the tax code is sufficient for criminal liability.

The decision significantly limited prosecutorial overreach by preventing the Omnibus Clause from becoming a catch-all felony for routine tax code violations. It reinforced the principle of fair notice by requiring a nexus between obstructive conduct and a known specific proceeding, providing clearer guidance for criminal tax administration and protecting ordinary taxpayers from arbitrary felony charges.