Lee v. United States

Jae Lee, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to a drug offense after his attorney repeatedly assured him he would not be deported. In reality, the offense was an aggravated felony that mandated removal under immigration law. When facing deportation, Lee sought to vacate his plea, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court and the Sixth Circuit denied relief, finding that Lee could not show a reasonable probability of acquittal at trial. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the context of a defendant whose overwhelming priority was avoiding deportation, a reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial but for his counsel’s errors was sufficient to establish prejudice, even if the trial would likely have resulted in conviction.

The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 6-2 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, reversed the lower courts. It held that Lee had demonstrated prejudice because, but for his attorney’s erroneous advice, he would have reasonably chosen to go to trial rather than accept a plea that guaranteed his deportation, even though trial carried a high risk of a longer sentence. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

Whether a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel in a guilty plea must always prove a reasonable probability of acquittal at trial to establish prejudice, or whether showing that a rational defendant in the same situation would have rejected the plea and opted for trial—despite low chances of acquittal—is sufficient when the incorrect advice led to mandatory deportation.

The decision significantly strengthened the constitutional rights of non-citizen criminal defendants by clarifying that immigration consequences are central to effective representation. It expanded the understanding of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington in the plea context, emphasizing the defendant’s subjective priorities. The ruling prompted defense attorneys to be far more diligent in providing accurate immigration warnings and gave defendants a firmer basis to challenge pleas predicated on misleading advice about deportation.