Sessions v. Dimaya

Sessions v. Dimaya, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on April 17, 2018, addressed whether a key definition of “crime of violence” in federal immigration law was unconstitutionally vague. James Dimaya, a lawful permanent resident from the Philippines, had two California convictions for first-degree residential burglary. The government sought to deport him, classifying the offense as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act because it allegedly met the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. §16(b). That clause defines a crime of violence as any felony “that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk” of physical force. Dimaya challenged the provision, arguing it failed to provide clear notice and invited arbitrary deportation decisions. The Court, in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kagan, extended the reasoning of Johnson v. United States, which had invalidated a similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act. The majority found that the “substantial risk” standard required judges to assess ordinary-case risks in an imprecise way, rendering the statute void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. §16(b) is unconstitutionally vague. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, holding that the provision fails to give ordinary people fair notice of its scope and invites arbitrary enforcement, thereby violating the Due Process Clause.

Whether the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. §16(b), which defines a “crime of violence” as a felony involving a substantial risk of physical force, is unconstitutionally vague under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when applied in immigration removal proceedings.

The ruling significantly constrained the government’s power to deport legal permanent residents based on vaguely defined violent crimes. It reinforced due process protections for immigrants and extended the void-for-vagueness doctrine from criminal sentencing to civil deportation contexts. The decision prompted immigration courts and legislators to reexamine removal criteria, limiting the automatic classification of certain state burglary offenses as aggravated felonies and underscoring the need for precise statutory language in immigration enforcement.