Delligatti v. United States

Salvatore Delligatti, an associate of the Genovese crime family, recruited gang members to kill Joseph Bonelli, a suspected police informant, and provided them with a loaded revolver. He was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using or carrying a firearm during a "crime of violence". The predicate offense was attempted second-degree murder under New York law via the VICAR statute. Delligatti argued that New York second-degree murder is not a crime of violence under §924(c)'s elements clause because it can be committed by omission—the failure to perform a legal duty—rather than by affirmative act. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether knowingly or intentionally causing bodily injury or death by failing to act constitutes the "use" of "physical force" under §924(c)(3)(A).

The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision in a 7-2 vote. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the majority opinion, holding that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the "use" of "physical force" against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A). The Court reasoned that it is impossible to deliberately cause physical harm without the use of physical force, extending the logic of United States v. Castleman to §924(c). Justice Neil M. Gorsuch, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, dissented, arguing that §924(c)(3)(A) does not reach crimes of omission. Delligatti was sentenced to 25 years in prison.

The central dispute was whether a crime committed by omission—the failure to act—can qualify as a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)'s elements clause, which requires "the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another". Delligatti contended that because New York second-degree murder can be committed by omission, it does not always involve the use of physical force and thus falls outside the elements clause. The government argued that the knowing or intentional causation of injury or death necessarily involves the use of physical force regardless of whether the harm is caused by act or omission.

The decision resolved a circuit split among ten federal appeals courts over whether a "crime of violence" under §924(c) can be committed by omission. By holding that omissions resulting in injury or death constitute the "use of physical force," the ruling broadened the scope of predicate offenses that trigger §924(c)'s mandatory minimum sentencing enhancement. This interpretation has significant implications for defendants convicted of crimes involving neglect or failure to act, such as parents who withhold medical care or caregivers who fail to provide necessities. The decision also reaffirmed and extended the categorical approach to determining whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence.